Read No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War

No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War

Michael R. Fenzel

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Description:The Soviet experience in Afghanistan provides a useful perspective on today's events in the region. Gorbachev decided in 1985 that a withdrawal should happen as soon as possible. The senior leadership of the Soviet Union became aware that their strategy was unraveling, their operational and tactical methods were not working, and the sacrifices they were demanding from the Soviet people and military were unlikely to produce the results they hoped for. They persisted nonetheless, and it took the Soviets another four years to get out.In No Miracles, Michael Fenzel explains why and how that happened, as viewed from the center of the Soviet state. From that perspective, three sources of failure stand out: poor civil-military relations; repeated and rapid turnover of Soviet leadership; and the perception that Soviet global prestige and influence were inexorably tied to the success of the Afghan mission. The cost of delay was high for Moscow and, now, the cost of delaying withdrawal is similarly high for the United States. The Soviet case is instructive for policymakers and suggests that speeding up plans for withdrawal and preventing engagement in another conflict might be strongly considered.We have made it easy for you to find a PDF Ebooks without any digging. And by having access to our ebooks online or by storing it on your computer, you have convenient answers with No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War. To get started finding No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War, you are right to find our website which has a comprehensive collection of manuals listed.
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ISBN: 0804799105

Description: The Soviet experience in Afghanistan provides a useful perspective on today's events in the region. Gorbachev decided in 1985 that a withdrawal should happen as soon as possible. The senior leadership of the Soviet Union became aware that their strategy was unraveling, their operational and tactical methods were not working, and the sacrifices they were demanding from the Soviet people and military were unlikely to produce the results they hoped for. They persisted nonetheless, and it took the Soviets another four years to get out.In No Miracles, Michael Fenzel explains why and how that happened, as viewed from the center of the Soviet state. From that perspective, three sources of failure stand out: poor civil-military relations; repeated and rapid turnover of Soviet leadership; and the perception that Soviet global prestige and influence were inexorably tied to the success of the Afghan mission. The cost of delay was high for Moscow and, now, the cost of delaying withdrawal is similarly high for the United States. The Soviet case is instructive for policymakers and suggests that speeding up plans for withdrawal and preventing engagement in another conflict might be strongly considered.We have made it easy for you to find a PDF Ebooks without any digging. And by having access to our ebooks online or by storing it on your computer, you have convenient answers with No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War. To get started finding No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War, you are right to find our website which has a comprehensive collection of manuals listed.
Our library is the biggest of these that have literally hundreds of thousands of different products represented.

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No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War

No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War

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