Read Transformation of Russian Militry Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya

Transformation of Russian Militry Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya

Alexei G. Arbatov

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Description:The use of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft and missiles against Serbia on March 24, 1999 ended the post–Cold War phase of international affairs. The Serbs conducted ethnic cleansing against the Albanians on an unprecedented scale, but these attacks escalated after the initiation of the NATO air campaign.The attack on Serbia suddenly removed a Russian taboo against the use of military force that followed the first war in Chechnya of 1994–1996. NATO’s military action was a final humiliation and a “spit in the face” for Russia, which more than ever before demonstrated the Western arrogance of power and its willingness to ignore Russian interests.Russia has learned many lessons from Kosovo. Above all, the end justifies the means. The use of force is the most efficient problem solver, if applied decisively and massively. Negotiations are of dubious value and should be used as a cover for military action. International law and human suffering are of secondary significance in achieving the goal. Massive devastation and collateral fatalities among the civilian population are acceptable in order to limit one’s own casualties. Foreign public opinion and the position of Western governments are to be discounted if Russian interests are at stake. The key to success is a concentrated campaign in the mass media and tight control over information about the war.After an unprecedented decade of disarmament, de–targeting of nuclear missiles, cooperation, and transparency in defense and security matters between Russia and the United States, Kosovo has revived the worst instincts and stereotypes of the Cold War. It is likely that US–Russian relations will never be the same as before March 24, 1999. The Clinton administration and its European allies bear full responsibility for this change.The growing rift between Russia and the West is reflected in new editions of the highest official documents: Russia’s National Security Concept and Military Doctrine. They emphasize nuclear deterrence and nuclear first use as the principal pillars of Russian security; robust conventional defense against a “Balkan–type” attack by NATO; and regular employment of the armed forces to deal with local, including domestic conflicts. Russian military spending will probably rise from the present 2.8 per cent of Gross National Product to about 3.5 per cent. That level of expenditure would permit several different options for future force structure, which are explored in the text.To prevent further tensions and military confrontation between Russia and the West, US–Russian and NATO–Russian security cooperation must be patiently and consistently rebuilt step–by–step. Pragmatically and without excessive expectations, the zone of cooperation must be expanded and given solid public support. The ratification of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty–II (START–II) by the Russian State Duma (Parliament) on April 14, 2000 gave a good start to such a policy. Now it depends largely on the United States whether a new START–III/Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) package can be negotiated. Other steps should be a tacit understanding that there will be no further NATO expansion during the next several years. The NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) could become the forum for planning joint peacekeeping operations, on which Moscow by definition should participate as an equal with NATO member states. At least tacitly, it must be recognized that NATO will not implement any new out–of–area military action, except by authorization of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Deep reductions and restructuring of conventional forces for joint peacekeeping operations could be a goal for the Conventional Armed Forces of Europe–2 (CFE–2) treaty process.Even if all these goals are achieved, the great dreams of post–Cold War integration, partnership, and even strategic alliance of the early 1990s will hardly be revived. However, further disintegration of the international security and arms control regimes can be stopped, and a reasonable measure of cooperation between Russia and the West can be enhanced— until the time when major new reforms in Russia’s domestic life, as well the West’s foreign policy and strategy, may open the door to much closer economic, political, and military integrationWe have made it easy for you to find a PDF Ebooks without any digging. And by having access to our ebooks online or by storing it on your computer, you have convenient answers with Transformation of Russian Militry Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya. To get started finding Transformation of Russian Militry Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya, you are right to find our website which has a comprehensive collection of manuals listed.
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Pages: 2003

Format: PDF, EPUB & Kindle Edition

Publisher: The Marshall Center

Release: 48

ISBN

Description: The use of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft and missiles against Serbia on March 24, 1999 ended the post–Cold War phase of international affairs. The Serbs conducted ethnic cleansing against the Albanians on an unprecedented scale, but these attacks escalated after the initiation of the NATO air campaign.The attack on Serbia suddenly removed a Russian taboo against the use of military force that followed the first war in Chechnya of 1994–1996. NATO’s military action was a final humiliation and a “spit in the face” for Russia, which more than ever before demonstrated the Western arrogance of power and its willingness to ignore Russian interests.Russia has learned many lessons from Kosovo. Above all, the end justifies the means. The use of force is the most efficient problem solver, if applied decisively and massively. Negotiations are of dubious value and should be used as a cover for military action. International law and human suffering are of secondary significance in achieving the goal. Massive devastation and collateral fatalities among the civilian population are acceptable in order to limit one’s own casualties. Foreign public opinion and the position of Western governments are to be discounted if Russian interests are at stake. The key to success is a concentrated campaign in the mass media and tight control over information about the war.After an unprecedented decade of disarmament, de–targeting of nuclear missiles, cooperation, and transparency in defense and security matters between Russia and the United States, Kosovo has revived the worst instincts and stereotypes of the Cold War. It is likely that US–Russian relations will never be the same as before March 24, 1999. The Clinton administration and its European allies bear full responsibility for this change.The growing rift between Russia and the West is reflected in new editions of the highest official documents: Russia’s National Security Concept and Military Doctrine. They emphasize nuclear deterrence and nuclear first use as the principal pillars of Russian security; robust conventional defense against a “Balkan–type” attack by NATO; and regular employment of the armed forces to deal with local, including domestic conflicts. Russian military spending will probably rise from the present 2.8 per cent of Gross National Product to about 3.5 per cent. That level of expenditure would permit several different options for future force structure, which are explored in the text.To prevent further tensions and military confrontation between Russia and the West, US–Russian and NATO–Russian security cooperation must be patiently and consistently rebuilt step–by–step. Pragmatically and without excessive expectations, the zone of cooperation must be expanded and given solid public support. The ratification of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty–II (START–II) by the Russian State Duma (Parliament) on April 14, 2000 gave a good start to such a policy. Now it depends largely on the United States whether a new START–III/Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) package can be negotiated. Other steps should be a tacit understanding that there will be no further NATO expansion during the next several years. The NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) could become the forum for planning joint peacekeeping operations, on which Moscow by definition should participate as an equal with NATO member states. At least tacitly, it must be recognized that NATO will not implement any new out–of–area military action, except by authorization of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Deep reductions and restructuring of conventional forces for joint peacekeeping operations could be a goal for the Conventional Armed Forces of Europe–2 (CFE–2) treaty process.Even if all these goals are achieved, the great dreams of post–Cold War integration, partnership, and even strategic alliance of the early 1990s will hardly be revived. However, further disintegration of the international security and arms control regimes can be stopped, and a reasonable measure of cooperation between Russia and the West can be enhanced— until the time when major new reforms in Russia’s domestic life, as well the West’s foreign policy and strategy, may open the door to much closer economic, political, and military integrationWe have made it easy for you to find a PDF Ebooks without any digging. And by having access to our ebooks online or by storing it on your computer, you have convenient answers with Transformation of Russian Militry Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya. To get started finding Transformation of Russian Militry Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya, you are right to find our website which has a comprehensive collection of manuals listed.
Our library is the biggest of these that have literally hundreds of thousands of different products represented.

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Transformation of Russian Militry Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya

Transformation of Russian Militry Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya

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